Identifying Oneself with the Face of Someone Else Impairs the Egocentered Visuo-spatial Mechanisms: A New Double Mirror Paradigm to Study Self-other Distinction and Interaction

Bérangère Thirioux, Moritz Wehrmann, Nicolas Langbour, Nematollah Jaafari, Alain Berthoz, Bérangère Thirioux, Moritz Wehrmann, Nicolas Langbour, Nematollah Jaafari, Alain Berthoz

Abstract

Looking at our face in a mirror is one of the strongest phenomenological experiences of the Self in which we need to identify the face as reflected in the mirror as belonging to us. Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies reported that self-face identification not only relies upon visual-mnemonic representation of one's own face but also upon continuous updating and integration of visuo-tactile signals. Therefore, bodily self-consciousness plays a major role in self-face identification, with respect to interplay between unisensory and multisensory processing. However, if previous studies demonstrated that the integration of multisensory body-related signals contributes to the visual processing of one's own face, there is so far no data regarding how self-face identification, inversely, contributes to bodily self-consciousness. In the present study, we tested whether self-other face identification impacts either the egocentered or heterocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms that are core processes of bodily self-consciousness and sustain self-other distinction. For that, we developed a new paradigm, named "Double Mirror." This paradigm, consisting of a semi-transparent double mirror and computer-controlled Light Emitting Diodes, elicits self-other face merging illusory effect in ecologically more valid conditions, i.e., when participants are physically facing each other and interacting. Self-face identification was manipulated by exposing pairs of participants to an Interpersonal Visual Stimulation in which the reflection of their faces merged in the mirror. Participants simultaneously performed visuo-spatial and mental own-body transformation tasks centered on their own face (egocentered) or the face of their partner (heterocentered) in the pre- and post-stimulation phase. We show that self-other face identification altered the egocentered visuo-spatial mechanisms. Heterocentered coding was preserved. Our data suggest that changes in self-face identification induced a bottom-up conflict between the current visual representation and the stored mnemonic representation of one's own face which, in turn, top-down impacted bodily self-consciousness.

Keywords: bodily self-consciousness; self-face identification; self–other distinction; visuo-spatial mechanisms.

Figures

FIGURE 1
FIGURE 1
The Double Mirror system.(A), Two individuals, A and B, are facing either side of the semi-transparent double mirror. A set of five white LEDs is fixed in the middle of the upper edge of each mirror’s side. (B) If the LEDs set on A’s side is on whereas that on B’s side is off, A can see his/her own face reflected in the mirror without seeing B’s face through the mirror. (C) In contrast, while using the same lighting mode, B can see A’s face through the mirror without seeing his/her own face reflected in the mirror (and vice-versa if the LEDs set on A’s and B’s side are, respectively, off and on). (D) If both LEDs sets are simultaneously on and alternatively flickering at a frequency of 8 Hz, the reflections of A’s and B’s faces are merging in the mirror.
FIGURE 2
FIGURE 2
Experimental setup and procedures.(A) We set up an entirely darkened enclosed area inside the testing room. The mirror was fixed transversally in the middle of a table and built in black curtain parts, splitting the enclosed area into two smaller areas. Each participant was seated on a stool at each end of the table in one dedicated area and facing his/her partner. (B) Participants used a serial response box with four mute response buttons that was placed in front of them and behind a black wood cover. (C) We placed two markers light, emitting green light, symmetrically on the participants’ left and right temples. Participants performed visuo-spatial transformation tasks with respect to green flashes that were emitted by the markers. Participants further wore B-Brand polyurethane ear plugs that prevented them from synchronizing their response with that of their partner.
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 3
Error patterns in the Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase.(A) Error patterns for Self-trials. Lateralization errors consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on the left side of one’s own face whereas it physically appeared on the right side. Attribution errors in reflection and rotation symmetry, respectively, consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on the left and right side of the partner’s face whereas it physically appeared on the right side of one’s own face. And vice-versa for flashes appearing on the left side of one’s own face. (B) Error patterns for Other-trials. Lateralization errors consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on the left side of the partner’s face whereas it appears on the right side. Attribution errors in reflection and rotation symmetry, respectively, consisted in assessing that the green flash appeared on the left and right side of one’s own face whereas it physically appeared on the right side of the partner’s face. And vice-versa for flashes appearing on the left side of the partner’s face.
FIGURE 4
FIGURE 4
Patterns of attribution errors with respect to visuo-spatial mechanisms and mental body transformations.(A) Attribution errors in reflection symmetry for Self-trials indicate that participants have identified their partner’s face with their own face by mentally translating their own-body in a linear fashion toward the other’s body. (B) Attribution errors in reflection symmetry for Other-trials indicate that participants identified their face with their partner’s face by mentally translating the other’s body in a linear fashion toward their own-body but without matching between the bodies’ axes. (C) For Self-trials, attribution errors in rotation symmetry reflect that participants adopted the visuo-spatial perspective of their partner (heterocentered mechanism) and felt themselves as being located in their facing partner’s body position (disembodied self-location). That is, they incorporated the other’s facial features into their own face by mentally rotating their own-body by 180° into their partner’s body and aligning their own-body axis on the body axis of their partner. (D) Attribution errors in rotation symmetry for Other-trials indicate that participants have incorporated the other’s facial features into the representation of their own face by mentally rotating the other’s body by 180° into their own-body and aligning the other’s body axis on their own body axis.
FIGURE 5
FIGURE 5
Percentages of correct performance and errors in the Interpersonal Visual Stimulation phase. Participants in the IVS phase performed correctly in ∼27% of the trials. There were ∼46% of errors. Attribution errors highly prevailed in comparison to lateralization errors. Percentage of attribution errors in reflection symmetry, i.e., in mirror like-fashion, was significantly higher than in rotation symmetry, i.e., with preservation of the lateral asymmetry.
FIGURE 6
FIGURE 6
Comparison of reaction times between the pre- and post-stimulation tests. Statistical comparisons showed that RTs significantly increased in the post-stimulation test in comparison to the pre-stimulation test. This was also observed for the Self-task but not for the Other-task.

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