Exploring Self-Consciousness From Self- and Other-Image Recognition in the Mirror: Concepts and Evaluation

Gaëlle Keromnes, Sylvie Chokron, Macarena-Paz Celume, Alain Berthoz, Michel Botbol, Roberto Canitano, Foucaud Du Boisgueheneuc, Nemat Jaafari, Nathalie Lavenne-Collot, Brice Martin, Tom Motillon, Bérangère Thirioux, Valeria Scandurra, Moritz Wehrmann, Ahmad Ghanizadeh, Sylvie Tordjman, Gaëlle Keromnes, Sylvie Chokron, Macarena-Paz Celume, Alain Berthoz, Michel Botbol, Roberto Canitano, Foucaud Du Boisgueheneuc, Nemat Jaafari, Nathalie Lavenne-Collot, Brice Martin, Tom Motillon, Bérangère Thirioux, Valeria Scandurra, Moritz Wehrmann, Ahmad Ghanizadeh, Sylvie Tordjman

Abstract

A historical review of the concepts of self-consciousness is presented, highlighting the important role of the body (particularly, body perception but also body action), and the social other in the construction of self-consciousness. More precisely, body perception, especially intermodal sensory perception including kinesthetic perception, is involved in the construction of a sense of self allowing self-other differentiation. Furthermore, the social other, through very early social and emotional interactions, provides meaning to the infant's perception and contributes to the development of his/her symbolization capacities. This is a necessary condition for body image representation and awareness of a permanent self in a time-space continuum (invariant over time and space). Self-image recognition impairments in the mirror are also discussed regarding a comprehensive developmental theory of self-consciousness. Then, a neuropsychological and neurophysiological approach to self-consciousness reviews the role of complex brain activation/integration pathways and the mirror neuron system in self-consciousness. Finally, this article offers new perspectives on self-consciousness evaluation using a double mirror paradigm to study self- and other- image and body recognition.

Keywords: body action; body image; body perception; body-self; development; intermodal sensory perception; self; self-consciousness.

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