Sociality as a natural mechanism of public goods provision

Elliot T Berkman, Evgeniya Lukinova, Ivan Menshikov, Mikhail Myagkov, Elliot T Berkman, Evgeniya Lukinova, Ivan Menshikov, Mikhail Myagkov

Abstract

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been offered to explain patterns of human behavior in social environments. In particular, these patterns include 'prosocial' ones, such as fairness, cooperation, and collective good provision. Psychologists suggest that these prosocial behaviors are driven not by miscalculations, but by salience of social identity, in-group favoritism, emotion, or evolutionary adaptations. This paper imports psychology scholarship into an economic model and results in a sustainable solution to collective action problems without any external enforcement mechanisms. This natural mechanism of public goods provision is created, analyzed, and observed in a controlled laboratory environment using experimental techniques.

Conflict of interest statement

Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Figures

Fig 1. Average of the Cooperation Rate.
Fig 1. Average of the Cooperation Rate.
The cooperation rate (y-axis) as a function of round or time (x-axis). Solid blue lines indicate average cooperation rate over time for Group 1 and People Game phase (average is taken for 6 experiments (socialization treatment)), solid red lines—for Group 2 and People Game phase, dotted blue lines—for Group 1 and Group Game phase, and dotted red lines for Group 2 and Group Game phase. Error bars represent standard error (SE).
Fig 2. Cooperation Maintenance, Individual Level.
Fig 2. Cooperation Maintenance, Individual Level.
The change in cooperation rate (from later to the earlier round of the game) for the Group Game phase (y-axis) as a function of change in cooperation in the People Game phase (x-axis) for Type 2 and Type 3 individuals. Type 2 are participants who cooperated more in People Game phase than in Group Game phase; Type 3 are participants who cooperated less in People Game phase, than in Group Game phase. Each square is a participant of Type 2, each triangle—participant of Type 3. Error bars represent standard error (SE).
Fig 3. IAT D-scores.
Fig 3. IAT D-scores.
The histogram of 84 IAT D-scores (x-axis) for the group association task completed in the end of each experiment. The dark bars indicate faster sorting of out-group with Unpleasant and in-group with Pleasant, gray bars indicate faster sorting of in-group with Unpleasant and out-group with Pleasant. The bar height (y-axis) indicates the number of people who scored within that range.
Fig 4. Explicit Test.
Fig 4. Explicit Test.
Kernel density estimates of explicit test scores. Solid line—for experiments with Socialization, dotted—for Control, dashed—for Normal distribution density.

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