What we say and what we do: the relationship between real and hypothetical moral choices

Oriel FeldmanHall, Dean Mobbs, Davy Evans, Lucy Hiscox, Lauren Navrady, Tim Dalgleish, Oriel FeldmanHall, Dean Mobbs, Davy Evans, Lucy Hiscox, Lauren Navrady, Tim Dalgleish

Abstract

Moral ideals are strongly ingrained within society and individuals alike, but actual moral choices are profoundly influenced by tangible rewards and consequences. Across two studies we show that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict moral choices made in hypothetical scenarios (Study 1). However, by systematically enhancing the contextual information available to subjects when addressing a hypothetical moral problem-thereby reducing the opportunity for mental simulation-we were able to incrementally bring subjects' responses in line with their moral behaviour in real situations (Study 2). These results imply that previous work relying mainly on decontextualized hypothetical scenarios may not accurately reflect moral decisions in everyday life. The findings also shed light on contextual factors that can alter how moral decisions are made, such as the salience of a personal gain.

Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Figures

Fig. 1
Fig. 1
(a) Experimental setup of the Real Pain versus Gain task. The Decider and Receiver (a confederate) met and interacted before the start of the experiment, during which the Decider was also given a low-level sample shock. The video feedback was actually pre-recorded videos of real shocks being administered. (b) Trial sequence for the Pain versus Gain task with highlighted decision event.
Fig. 2
Fig. 2
(a) Money retained across Study 1b shows that subjects, when responding to a written hypothetical version of the PvG task highly prioritise the Receiver’s physical welfare as compared to those in the Real condition who maximise their own self-interest. (b) Money retained across Study 2 illustrates that as more contextual information—like the specific nature of the reward and harm contingencies of the decision—became available to subjects, hypothetical moral probes better predicted real moral decisions.

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Source: PubMed

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