Sustainable Financial Incentives To Improve Prescription Practices For Malaria
調査の概要
詳細な説明
Global investments in controlling malaria have led to some exciting reductions in the burden of malaria. In some areas, malaria-related deaths have dropped by more than 90%. As malaria transmission declines, a greater fraction of pediatric fevers are from other causes. However, these fevers continue to be treated as malaria, often despite the availability of diagnostic testing. In a typical rural health facility in Kenya, more than 90% of febrile patients are prescribed an antimalarial when no diagnostic tests are available. Even when microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) are available, between 50-80% of patients with a negative test are nonetheless prescribed antimalarials. Inappropriately treated fevers in children can lead to serious consequences for the patient and can accelerate the spread of drug resistance. In addition to the risk to patients, overuse of antimalarials also puts a financial strain on the government health system. Although there is considerable incentive for governments to reduce drug costs and wastage, the financial pressure is not experienced at the appropriate levels of decision-making.
This project aims to test an innovative, sustainable financial incentive designed to reduce the number of non-malarial fevers that are treated inappropriately with antimalarial drugs. The study team will test a financial incentive targeted at the health facility to determine if it improves adherence to diagnostic results and clinical protocols. Eighteen rural health facilities in Western Kenya will be enrolled and randomly allocated to one of two arms. The study team will compare the effectiveness of clinical and technical training in diagnosis of malaria alone (Arm 1) to training plus financial incentives linked to prescription practices (Arm 2) in improving diagnosis and treatment of malaria and non-malaria fevers. The practice of prescribing antimalarials to patients with a negative diagnostic will be compared between facilities with and without the incentive structure. Secondary outcomes will include sensitivity and specificity of routine microscopy at health centers, use of alternative treatments for slide negative fevers, and frequency of stock-outs of antimalarial drugs.
This project will tackle an important implementation research problem. It seeks to test solutions to the problem of poor adherence to evidence-based clinical guidelines for malaria treatment, and thereby reduce inappropriate antimalarial drug use and drug wastage. This project will be conducted in collaboration with Kenya's Division of Malaria Control and avenues to roll-out the intervention, if successful, will be actively explored.
研究の種類
入学 (実際)
段階
- 適用できない
連絡先と場所
研究場所
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Rift Valley Province
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Eldoret、Rift Valley Province、ケニア、30100
- Moi University
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参加基準
適格基準
就学可能な年齢
- 子
- 大人
- 高齢者
健康ボランティアの受け入れ
受講資格のある性別
説明
Inclusion Criteria:
- Health facility (level 3) in Western or Rift valley province, within the Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare (AMPATH) catchment area
- Consent from Provincial Medical Officer of Health, District Medical Officer of Health and Health facility in-charge
- Functioning laboratory including microscopic diagnosis of malaria and at least one laboratory technician.
Exclusion Criteria:
- Lack of consent from any level
- Lack of adequate laboratory infrastructure or personnel
研究計画
研究はどのように設計されていますか?
デザインの詳細
- 主な目的:ヘルスサービス研究
- 割り当て:ランダム化
- 介入モデル:並列代入
武器と介入
参加者グループ / アーム |
介入・治療 |
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実験的:Performance based incentives
Performance based incentives: The Incentive arm will receive monthly visits and external quality assurance of malaria diagnostic accuracy, identical to the comparison.
Incentive arm will also receive quarterly incentives linked to performance of the facility around six indicators of appropriate malaria case management
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Facilities enrolled in the intervention arm will receive a financial incentive that is based on their diagnosis and prescription practices for malaria over that quarter.
The intervention will last 12 months.
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介入なし:Comparison
The comparison arm will receive monthly visits and monthly external quality assurance of malaria diagnostic accuracy.
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この研究は何を測定していますか?
主要な結果の測定
結果測定 |
メジャーの説明 |
時間枠 |
|---|---|---|
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Proportion of children under 5 years of age who are treated with antimalarials following a negative malaria test
時間枠:At one year post-intervention
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The study is designed to detect a reduction in the proportion of children under 5 years of age who are prescribed antimalarials following a negative malaria diagnostic test between the intervention and comparison arms.
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At one year post-intervention
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協力者と研究者
スポンサー
協力者
出版物と役立つリンク
一般刊行物
- Menya D, Platt A, Manji I, Sang E, Wafula R, Ren J, Cheruiyot O, Armstrong J, Neelon B, O'Meara WP. Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial. BMC Med. 2015 Oct 16;13:268. doi: 10.1186/s12916-015-0497-y.
- Menya D, Logedi J, Manji I, Armstrong J, Neelon B, O'Meara WP. An innovative pay-for-performance (P4P) strategy for improving malaria management in rural Kenya: protocol for a cluster randomized controlled trial. Implement Sci. 2013 May 8;8:48. doi: 10.1186/1748-5908-8-48.
研究記録日
主要日程の研究
研究開始
一次修了 (実際)
研究の完了 (実際)
試験登録日
最初に提出
QC基準を満たした最初の提出物
最初の投稿 (見積もり)
学習記録の更新
投稿された最後の更新 (見積もり)
QC基準を満たした最後の更新が送信されました
最終確認日
詳しくは
この情報は、Web サイト clinicaltrials.gov から変更なしで直接取得したものです。研究の詳細を変更、削除、または更新するリクエストがある場合は、register@clinicaltrials.gov。 までご連絡ください。 clinicaltrials.gov に変更が加えられるとすぐに、ウェブサイトでも自動的に更新されます。
Performance based incentivesの臨床試験
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Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria de la Fundación...募集
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Zuyderland Medisch Centrum完了上肢骨折 | 橈骨遠位端骨折 | 上腕骨の近位端の骨折 | 上肢骨折オランダ
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Oxford Biomedical Technologies, Inc.積極的、募集していない
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Hacettepe University積極的、募集していない
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Istanbul Medeniyet Universityまだ募集していません
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University of Wisconsin, MadisonNational Institute on Aging (NIA)完了