Sustainable Financial Incentives To Improve Prescription Practices For Malaria
研究概览
详细说明
Global investments in controlling malaria have led to some exciting reductions in the burden of malaria. In some areas, malaria-related deaths have dropped by more than 90%. As malaria transmission declines, a greater fraction of pediatric fevers are from other causes. However, these fevers continue to be treated as malaria, often despite the availability of diagnostic testing. In a typical rural health facility in Kenya, more than 90% of febrile patients are prescribed an antimalarial when no diagnostic tests are available. Even when microscopy or rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) are available, between 50-80% of patients with a negative test are nonetheless prescribed antimalarials. Inappropriately treated fevers in children can lead to serious consequences for the patient and can accelerate the spread of drug resistance. In addition to the risk to patients, overuse of antimalarials also puts a financial strain on the government health system. Although there is considerable incentive for governments to reduce drug costs and wastage, the financial pressure is not experienced at the appropriate levels of decision-making.
This project aims to test an innovative, sustainable financial incentive designed to reduce the number of non-malarial fevers that are treated inappropriately with antimalarial drugs. The study team will test a financial incentive targeted at the health facility to determine if it improves adherence to diagnostic results and clinical protocols. Eighteen rural health facilities in Western Kenya will be enrolled and randomly allocated to one of two arms. The study team will compare the effectiveness of clinical and technical training in diagnosis of malaria alone (Arm 1) to training plus financial incentives linked to prescription practices (Arm 2) in improving diagnosis and treatment of malaria and non-malaria fevers. The practice of prescribing antimalarials to patients with a negative diagnostic will be compared between facilities with and without the incentive structure. Secondary outcomes will include sensitivity and specificity of routine microscopy at health centers, use of alternative treatments for slide negative fevers, and frequency of stock-outs of antimalarial drugs.
This project will tackle an important implementation research problem. It seeks to test solutions to the problem of poor adherence to evidence-based clinical guidelines for malaria treatment, and thereby reduce inappropriate antimalarial drug use and drug wastage. This project will be conducted in collaboration with Kenya's Division of Malaria Control and avenues to roll-out the intervention, if successful, will be actively explored.
研究类型
注册 (实际的)
阶段
- 不适用
联系人和位置
学习地点
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Rift Valley Province
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Eldoret、Rift Valley Province、肯尼亚、30100
- Moi University
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参与标准
资格标准
适合学习的年龄
- 孩子
- 成人
- 年长者
接受健康志愿者
有资格学习的性别
描述
Inclusion Criteria:
- Health facility (level 3) in Western or Rift valley province, within the Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare (AMPATH) catchment area
- Consent from Provincial Medical Officer of Health, District Medical Officer of Health and Health facility in-charge
- Functioning laboratory including microscopic diagnosis of malaria and at least one laboratory technician.
Exclusion Criteria:
- Lack of consent from any level
- Lack of adequate laboratory infrastructure or personnel
学习计划
研究是如何设计的?
设计细节
- 主要用途:卫生服务研究
- 分配:随机化
- 介入模型:并行分配
武器和干预
参与者组/臂 |
干预/治疗 |
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实验性的:Performance based incentives
Performance based incentives: The Incentive arm will receive monthly visits and external quality assurance of malaria diagnostic accuracy, identical to the comparison.
Incentive arm will also receive quarterly incentives linked to performance of the facility around six indicators of appropriate malaria case management
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Facilities enrolled in the intervention arm will receive a financial incentive that is based on their diagnosis and prescription practices for malaria over that quarter.
The intervention will last 12 months.
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无干预:Comparison
The comparison arm will receive monthly visits and monthly external quality assurance of malaria diagnostic accuracy.
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研究衡量的是什么?
主要结果指标
结果测量 |
措施说明 |
大体时间 |
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Proportion of children under 5 years of age who are treated with antimalarials following a negative malaria test
大体时间:At one year post-intervention
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The study is designed to detect a reduction in the proportion of children under 5 years of age who are prescribed antimalarials following a negative malaria diagnostic test between the intervention and comparison arms.
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At one year post-intervention
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合作者和调查者
合作者
出版物和有用的链接
一般刊物
- Menya D, Platt A, Manji I, Sang E, Wafula R, Ren J, Cheruiyot O, Armstrong J, Neelon B, O'Meara WP. Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial. BMC Med. 2015 Oct 16;13:268. doi: 10.1186/s12916-015-0497-y.
- Menya D, Logedi J, Manji I, Armstrong J, Neelon B, O'Meara WP. An innovative pay-for-performance (P4P) strategy for improving malaria management in rural Kenya: protocol for a cluster randomized controlled trial. Implement Sci. 2013 May 8;8:48. doi: 10.1186/1748-5908-8-48.
研究记录日期
研究主要日期
学习开始
初级完成 (实际的)
研究完成 (实际的)
研究注册日期
首次提交
首先提交符合 QC 标准的
首次发布 (估计)
研究记录更新
最后更新发布 (估计)
上次提交的符合 QC 标准的更新
最后验证
更多信息
此信息直接从 clinicaltrials.gov 网站检索,没有任何更改。如果您有任何更改、删除或更新研究详细信息的请求,请联系 register@clinicaltrials.gov. clinicaltrials.gov 上实施更改,我们的网站上也会自动更新.
Performance based incentives的临床试验
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Arash Asher, MDVoxxLife招聘中
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Thomas Jefferson University完全的
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University of ConnecticutUnited States Department of Defense; AMP Human; Park City, UT完全的
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University of ConnecticutUnited States Department of Defense; AMP Human; Park City, UT完全的